CAPITAL ISSUES IN THE CARIBBEAN: A CASE STUDY

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Content

- Company Overview
- Caribbean Environmental Scan
- Engagement Process
- Rating
- Roadshow

Company Overview

- History
 - > 176 years, first 147 years, domestic, mono line, mutual
 - Next 29 years evolved into a regional, multi line, proprietary
 - ➤ Widely held company, 98% of s/holders own less than 25,000 shares and own 42%
- Financial Highlights
 - Equity \$739m (\$152m:2001)
 - Assets \$6.4bn (\$1.3bn:2001)
 - Revenue \$1.1bn (\$314m:2001)
 - PAT \$77m (\$7m:2001)
- Ratings & Leverage
 - A- Excellent
 - > BB-
 - Debt/Capital 30%
 - > CAR 221%

Caribbean Environmental Scan

Economic

- Main activity tourism (ex Trinidad & Tobago, oil & gas)
- > Primary deficits (ex Jamaica) and hence fiscal deficits
- Debt stocks (ex Trinidad & Tobago, Guyana) more than 100% GDP
- Current account deficits (ex Trinidad)
- > High structural unemployment
- Weak economic growth (ex Guyana & Surinam)

Regulatory

- > No common rules on investment, capital, reserving, market conduct, reporting
- Distressed entities receive a free pass
- Disorderly resolution of distressed entities
- Governments continue to write pension & insurance liabilities with no rules
- Capital controls

Caribbean Environmental Scan

Capital Markets

- > Insufficient long term assets
- Fiscal position results in high risk free rates and cost of capital
- Borrowing needs of government crowds out private capital
- Weak stock market microstructures so markets highly illiquid
 - ✓ No market makers
 - √ No stock lending
 - ✓ No short selling
 - ✓ Rights issues successful only if underwritten by anchor investor

Industry

- Multi nationals "exiting" region
- Capital eroded through restructurings of debt
- Localisation of capital results in sub optimal use of capital
- Capital rules ignore entities that are diversified by country, line & customer segment

Engagement Process

Timing

- > Close to existing maturities, investors have the edge
- > Too early, carrying cost of additional capital

Size

- > Minimum, \$200m to warrant interest
- > \$300m qualifies for index and attractive to indexed fund managers

Actors

- > Investment bank, investors, 2x lawyers, auditors, rating agencies
- Prospectus
 - Shelf life so limited window so clocks starts existing
 - > Reality is no one reads it
- Rating
- Roadshow

Rating

- At least one rating
- Issues
 - Rating agencies US centric view of risk
 - Entity complex by line of business and countries
 - Rating of entity and then rating of instrument
 - Instrument rated lower than entity due to subordination of bondholders to policyholders
 - Capital controls create further transfer and convertibility risks

Rating

- Rating agencies provide few hours notice before issuing rating
- Rating usually cannot exceed rating of country of domicile
- Exceptional circumstances can result in a rating capped at two notches above country of domicile
- Choices were change in rating methodology or change in domicile
- Redomiciliation chosen

Roadshow

- Must show intimate knowledge of your company and its environment
- No question should be unanswered
- No further engagement
- Investors place bids on amounts and price over 1-2 trading days
- Pricing at margin so oversubscription critical
- Allocation subjective because want mix of institutions, geography to ensure continued access

Roadshow

- Timing critical, 1-2 days after roadshow to decide go/no-go
 - > One week delay due to Greece & Brazil
 - > Start of roadshow, fall in markets triggered by China
- Present over internet and field questions
- Two weeks in London, New York, Los Angeles, Boston, Chicago
- 10ish face to face presentations each day
- Many interrogate from start to end and ignore any presentations

Summary

- Management's Performance in Roadshow
- Rating
- Timing
- Size of issue
- Market conditions
- Luck