The Life Cycle Model with Recursive Utility: Defined benefit vs defined contribution.

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Abstract

We analyze optimal consumption and portfolio choice when the agent takes the market as given, with applications to pension insurance. First, we recall the results for the conventional additive and separable expected utility model. We explain why this model is not viable in a temporal context. As a consequence, when confronted with real data this theory meets with several conflicting implications. Second, we consider recursive utility, which in contrast has an axiomatic underpinning in a temporal context. All the anomalies of the expected utility approach that we are aware of, disappear with recursive utility. This we find striking, as it calls for a shift in paradigm. The alternative theory explains why people prefer stable pension plans, like defined benefit, to a mere mutual fund, it removes anomalies in the conventional, optimal portfolio choice theory when confronted with market data, and it solves the celebrated equity premium puzzle. Since the recursive model fits market data much more convincingly than the conventional model, this leaves more credibility to the former representation, and more weight to recommendations based on it.

KEYWORDS: The life cycle model, recursive utility, consumption smoothing, consumption puzzles, defined benefit, defined contribution, the equity premium puzzle

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1 Introduction

In the standard life cycle model with additive and separable utility one can not separate risk aversion from the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption. Since these are different aspects of an individual’s preferences this is clearly a weakness with the standard model.

We consider the consumer in the life cycle model having recursive utility, in a continuous-time setting. Here we focus on optimal consumption, and its consequences for optimal pension insurance. In the paper Aase (2016b) it is shown that with recursive utility, instead of the standard expected utility in a dynamic setting, both market risk premiums and the real equilibrium interest rate explain market and consumption data over the past 100 years or so, with reasonable parameters of the utility function. This has consequences for the life cycle model, and for all of economic dynamics for that matter, where now optimal consumption finally becomes consistent with aggregate market data.

The recursive utility customer finds it optimal to smooth market shocks to a larger extent than the conventional expected utility model predicts. One question is then how this can be accomplished in the real world. This is of great importance when analyzing pensions and life insurance contracts, where insuring consumers against adverse shocks in the market ought to be a main issue. After the financial crisis in 2008, insurers are inclined to pass all, or most of the financial risk to its customers, presenting them with mainly defined contribution, or unit linked pension plans. The lessons from the present paper for the insurance industry is clear: To provide the kind of consumption smoothing that consumers of the last century seem to prefer, which clearly points in the direction of defined benefit rather than defined contribution pension plans.

The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the model of the financial market, recursive utility is introduced in Section 3, in Section 4 we discuss optimal consumption. In Section 5 we discuss pensions, Section 6 treats the associated optimal portfolio choice, and Section 7 concludes.

2 The Financial Market

We consider a consumer/insurance customer who has access to a securities market, as well as a credit market and pension and life insurance contracts. This section draws form the lessons learnt from the literature on derivative securities following the analysis of options in the paper by Black and Scholes (1973).
The securities market can be described by the vector $\nu_t$ of expected returns of $N$ given risky securities in excess of the risk-less instantaneous return $r_t$, and $\sigma_t$ is an $N \times N$ matrix of diffusion coefficients of the risky asset prices, normalized by the asset process, so that $\sigma_t \sigma'_t$ is the instantaneous covariance matrix for asset returns. Both $\nu_t$ and $\sigma_t$ are assumed to be progressively measurable stochastic processes. Here $N$ is also the dimension of the Brownian motion $B$.

We assume that the cumulative return process $R^n_t$ is an ergodic, stochastic process for each $n$, where $dX^n_t = X^n_t dR^n_t$ for $n = 1, 2, \ldots, N$, and $X^n_t$ is the cum dividend price process of the $n$th risky asset.

Underlying is a probability space $(\Omega, \mathcal{F}, P)$ and an increasing information filtration $\mathcal{F}_t$ generated by the $N$-dimensional Brownian motion, and satisfying the usual conditions. Each price process $X^n_t$ is a continuous stochastic process, and we suppose that $\sigma^{(0)} = 0$, so that $r_t = \mu_0(t)$ is the risk-free interest rate, also a stochastic process. $T$ is the finite horizon of the economy. The state price deflator $\pi(t)$ is given by

$$\pi_t = \xi_t e^{-\int_0^t r_s ds},$$

where the 'density' process $\xi$ has the representation

$$\xi_t = \exp\left(-\int_0^t \eta'_s \cdot dB_s - \frac{1}{2} \int_0^t \eta'_s \cdot \eta_s ds\right).$$

Here $\eta(t)$ is the market-price-of-risk for the discounted price process $X_t e^{-\int_0^t r_s ds}$, defined by

$$\sigma(\omega, t)\eta(\omega, t) = \nu(\omega, t), \quad (\omega, t) \in \Omega \times [0, T],$$

where the $n$th component of $\nu_t$ equals $(\mu_n(t) - r_t)$, the excess rate of return on security $n$, $n = 1, 2, \ldots, N$. From Ito’s lemma it follows from (2) that

$$d\xi_t = -\xi_t \eta'_t \cdot dB_t,$$

and, from (1) it follows that

$$d\pi_t = -r_t \pi_t dt - \pi_t \eta'_t dB_t.$$
$L_+$, the positive cone of $L$, is the set of consumption rate processes. The specific form of the function $U$ is specified in the next section.

For a price $\pi_t$ of the consumption good, the problem is to solve

$$\sup_{c \in L_+} U(c),$$

subject to the budget constraint

$$E\left\{ \int_0^T \pi_t c_t dt \right\} \leq E\left\{ \int_0^T \pi_t e_t dt \right\} := w. \quad (7)$$

The quantity $\pi_t$ is also known as the "state price deflator", or the Arrow-Debreu prices in units of probability. State prices reflect what the representative consumer is willing to pay for an extra unit of consumption; in particular is $\pi_t$ high in "times of crises" and low in "good times".

The present situation is known as a *temporal* problem of choice. In such a setting it is far from clear that the time additive and separable form expected utility is the natural representation of preferences. For example, derived preferences do not satisfy the substitution axiom (see e.g., Mossin (1969), Kreps (1988)). This is the axiom that gives additivity in probability of the utility function. If this property does not hold for any time $t$, it certainly does not help to add the representation across time. Also, the resulting model does not explain aggregate market data (e.g., the equity premium puzzle).

When there is no market uncertainty, i.e., $\xi_t = 1$ for all $t \in [0,T]$, the Ramsey (1928) model applies. This model does not encounter this problem with the axioms, but has of course problems with realism.\[1\]

The consumer’s problem is, for each initial wealth level $w$, to solve

$$\sup_{(c,\varphi)} U(c)$$

subject to an intertemporal budget constraint

$$dW_t = (W_t(\varphi'_t \cdot \nu_t + r_t) - c_t) dt + W_t \varphi'_t \cdot \sigma_t dB_t, \quad W_0 = w. \quad (9)$$

Here $\varphi'_t = (\varphi^{(1)}_t, \varphi^{(2)}_t, \ldots, \varphi^{(N)}_t)$ are the fractions of total wealth held in the risky securities.

A more detailed description of the steps leading to the problem (8) with the dynamic constraint (9) can be found in Duffie (2001), Ch 9, p 206. See also Aase (2015b), Section 2. That this problem is equivalent to problem (6)-(7) when markets are complete, is shown in Pliska (1986) and Cox and Huang (1989), among others.

\[1\]Also, the *timeless* problem with two time points only, uncertainty only on the last time and no consumption choice at the first, does not have this problem with the axioms.
3 Recursive utility

3.1 Introduction

We now introduce recursive utility. Here we use the framework established by Duffie and Epstein (1992a-b) and Duffie and Skiadas (1994) which elaborate the foundational work by Kreps and Porteus (1978) of recursive utility in dynamic models. Recursive utility leads to the separation of risk aversion from the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption, within a time-consistent model framework.

The recursive utility $U : L \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ is defined by two primitive functions: $f : \mathbb{R} \times \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ and $A : \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$. The function $f(c_t, V_t)$ corresponds to a felicity index, and $A$ corresponds to a measure of absolute risk aversion of the Arrow-Pratt type for the agent. In addition to current consumption $c_t$, the function $f$ also depends on utility $V_t$ at time $t$, a stochastic process with volatility $\tilde{\sigma}_V(t) := Z_t$ at each time $t$.

The utility process $V$ for a given consumption process $c$, satisfying $V_T = 0$, is given by the representation

$$V_t = E_t \left\{ \int_t^T \left( f(c_s, V_s) - \frac{1}{2} A(V_s) \tilde{\sigma}_V(s) \tilde{\sigma}_V(s) \right) ds \right\}, \quad t \in [0, T] \quad (10)$$

If, for each consumption process $c_t$, there is a well-defined utility process $V$, the stochastic differential utility $U$ is defined by $U(c) = V_0$, the initial utility. The pair $(f, A)$ generating $V$ is called an aggregator.

The utility function $U$ is monotonic and risk averse if $A(\cdot) \geq 0$ and $f$ is jointly concave and increasing in consumption.

As for the last term in (10), recall the Arrow-Prat approximation to the certainty equivalent of a mean zero risk $X$. It is $-\frac{1}{2} A(\cdot) \sigma^2$, where $\sigma^2$ is the variance of $X$, and $A(\cdot)$ is the absolute risk aversion function.

In the discrete time world the starting point for recursive utility is that future utility at time $t$ is given by $V_t = g(c_t, m(V_{t+1}))$ for some function $g : \mathbb{R} \times \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$, where $m$ is a certainty equivalent at time $t$ (see e.g., Epstein and Zin (1989)). If $h$ is a von Neumann-Morgenstern index, then $m(V) = h^{-1}(E[h(V)])$. The passage to the continuous-time version in (10) is explained in Duffie and Epstein (1992b).

The preference ordering represented by recursive utility is assumed to satisfy: Dynamic consistency, in the sense of Johnsen and Donaldson (1985); Independence of past consumption; and State independence of time preference (see Skiadas (2009a)).

Unlike expected utility theory in a timeless situation, i.e., when consumption only takes place at the end, in a temporal setting where the agent
consumes in every period, derived preferences do not satisfy the substitution axiom (e.g., Mossin (1969), Kreps (1988)). Thus additive Eu-theory in a dynamic context, i.e., in situations where a financial market is utilized by the agents to smooth consumption across time and states of the world, has no axiomatic underpinning, unlike recursive utility (Kreps and Porteus (1978), Chew and Epstein (1991)). It is notable that one of the four central axioms in the latter theory, \textit{recursivity}, is essentially identical to the notion of consistency the sense of Johnsen and Donaldson (1985). Kreps and Porteus (1978) call this \textit{temporal consistency}.

### 3.2 The specification we work with

Stochastic differential utility disentangles intertemporal substitution from risk aversion: In the case of deterministic consumption, $\tilde{\sigma}_V(t) = 0$ for all $t$. Hence risk aversion $A$ is then irrelevant, since it multiplies a zero variance. Thus certainty preferences, including the willingness to substitute consumption across time, are determined by $f$ alone. Only risk attitudes are affected by changes in $A$ for $f$ fixed. In particular, if

$$\tilde{A}() \geq A()$$

where $U$ and $\tilde{U}$ are utility functions corresponding to $(f, A)$ and $(f, \tilde{A})$ respectively, then $\tilde{U}$ is more risk averse than $U$ in the sense that any consumption process $c$ rejected by $U$ in favor of some deterministic process $\bar{c}$ would also be rejected by $\tilde{U}$.

We work with the Kreps-Porteus utility, with aggregator with the CES specification

$$f(c, v) = \frac{\delta}{1 - \rho} \frac{c^{(1-\rho)} - \tilde{v}^{(1-\rho)}}{v^{-\rho}} \quad \text{and} \quad A(v) = \frac{\gamma}{v}.$$  \hspace{1cm} (11)

The parameter $\delta \geq 0$ is the agent’s impatience rate, $\rho \geq 0$, $\rho \neq 1$ is the time preference and $\gamma \geq 0$, $\gamma \neq 1$, is the relative risk aversion. The parameter $\psi = 1/\rho$ is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption, referred to as the EIS-parameter. The higher the value of the parameter $\rho$ is, the more aversion the agent has towards consumption fluctuations \textit{across time} in a deterministic world. The higher the value of $\gamma$, the more aversion the agent has to consumption fluctuations, due to the different states of the world that can occur. Clearly these two properties of an individual’s preferences are different. In the conventional model $\gamma = \rho$. The discrete-time analog of (11) is the one given by Epstein and Zin (1989-91).

Recursive utility has an \textit{ordinally equivalent} specification. When the aggregator $(f, A)$ is given corresponding to the utility function $U$, there exists
a strictly increasing and smooth function $\varphi(\cdot)$ such that the ordinally equivalent $U_1 = \varphi \circ U$ has the aggregator $(f_1, A_1)$ where

$$f_1(c, v) = \left( (1 - \gamma)v \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\gamma}} f(c, \left( (1 - \gamma)v \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\gamma}}), \quad A_1 = 0.$$ 

The connection is

$$U_1 = \frac{1}{1-\gamma} U^{1-\gamma}.$$ 

This is the specification Duffie and Epstein (1991) work with, where $f_1$ has the CES-form

$$f_1(c, v) = \frac{\delta}{1 - \rho} \left( \frac{c^{(1-\rho)} - \left( (1 - \gamma)v \right)^{\frac{1-\rho}{1-\gamma}}}{\left( (1 - \gamma)v \right)^{\frac{1-\rho}{1-\gamma}}} \right), \quad A_1(v) = 0. \quad (12)$$

Is is emphasized in the above reference that the reduction to a normalized aggregator $(f_1, 0)$ does not mean that intertemporal utility is risk neutral, or that this representation has lost the ability to separate risk aversion from substitution. The corresponding utility $U_1$ retains the essential features, namely that of partly disentangling intertemporal elasticity of substitution from risk aversion. However, we can not claim any more that $f_1$ alone determines the willingness to substitute consumption across time.

The version (12) was analyzed in Aase (2015b) in the life cycle model, and by Duffie and Epstein (1992a,b) in the rational expectations equilibrium model. Similarly Schroder and Skiadas (1999) analyzed various versions of recursive utility with $A = 0$ related to the life cycle model. In the present paper we analyze the version (11) directly, using the stochastic maximum principle.

As can be seen, this version explains the separation of risk aversion from time substitution, but is also the version which is the most demanding to work with. The method we use, the stochastic maximum principle, allows for state dependence and a non-Markovian structure of the economy. This is more difficult to handle using dynamic programming.

### 3.3 The first order conditions

In the following we find the solution to the consumer’s problem. For any of the versions $i = 1, 2$ formulated in the previous section, the problem is to solve

$$\sup_{c \in L_+} U(c)$$

subject to the budget constraint

$$E\left\{ \int_0^T c_t \pi_t dt \right\} \leq E\left\{ \int_0^T c_t \pi_t dt \right\}.$$
Here \( V_t = V_t^c \) and \( Z(t) := \tilde{\sigma}_V(t) \) is the solution of the backward stochastic differential equation (BSDE)

\[
\begin{aligned}
    dV_t &= -\tilde{f}(t, c_t, V_t, \tilde{\sigma}_V(t)) \, dt + Z(t) \, dB_t \\
    V_T &= 0,
\end{aligned}
\]  

(13)

where

\[
\tilde{f}(t, c_t, V_t, Z(t)) = f(c_t, V_t) - \frac{1}{2} A(V_t) Z(t)^2 Z(t).
\]

Notice that (13) covers both the versions (11) and (12).

Existence and uniqueness of solutions of the BSDE (13) is proven in Duffie and Lions (1992) for the Epstein-Zin specification.

For \( \alpha > 0 \) define the Lagrangian

\[
L(c; \alpha) = U(c) - \alpha E\left( \int_0^T \pi_t(c_t - e_t) dt \right).
\]

(14)

Important is that the volatility \( Z(t) := \tilde{\sigma}_V(t) \) is exogenously given as part of the preferences. Below we shall see that there is a connection between this volatility and two other volatilities, namely that of the agent’s wealth and optimal consumption.

Because of the generality of the problem, we utilize the stochastic maximum principle (see Pontryagin (1972), Bismut (1978), Kushner (1972), Bensoussan (1983), Peng (1990), and Øksendal and Sulem (2013)) : We are then given a system of forward/backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDE) consisting of the simple FSDE \( dX(t) = 0; X(0) = 0 \) and the BSDE (13). The objective function is

\[
L(c; \alpha) = V_0^c - \alpha E\left( \int_0^T \pi_t(c_t - e_t) dt \right)
\]

(14)

where \( \alpha \) is the Lagrange multiplier. The Hamiltonian for this problem is

\[
H(t, c, v, z, y) = y_t \tilde{f}(t, c_t, v_t, z_t) - \alpha \pi_t(c_t - e_t)
\]

(15)

where \( y_t \) is the adjoint variable. It is given by

\[
\begin{aligned}
    dY_t &= Y(t)\left( \frac{\partial f}{\partial v}(t, c_t, V_t, Z(t)) dt + \frac{\partial f}{\partial x}(t, c_t, V_t, Z(t)) dB_t \right) \\
    Y_0 &= 1.
\end{aligned}
\]

(16)

Here the process \( X \) is used in the general formulation, and must be set equal to zero in the application at hand; it is not the return on a risky asset.
where we use the notation $Z(t) = \tilde{\sigma}_V(t)$, and $z$ as the generic variable. If $c^*$ is optimal we therefore have

$$Y_t = \exp\left(\int_0^t \left\{ \frac{\partial \tilde{f}}{\partial v}(s, c^*_s, V_s, Z(s)) - \frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{\partial \tilde{f}}{\partial z}(s, c^*_s, V_s, Z(s)) \right)^2 \right\} ds + \int_0^t \frac{\partial \tilde{f}}{\partial z}(s, c^*_s, V_s, Z(s)) dB(s) \right) \quad \text{a.s.} \quad (17)$$

Maximizing the Hamiltonian with respect to $c$ gives the first order equation

$$y \frac{\partial \tilde{f}}{\partial c}(t, c^*, v, z) - \alpha \pi = 0$$

or

$$\alpha \pi_t = Y(t) \frac{\partial \tilde{f}}{\partial c}(t, c^*_t, V(t), Z(t)) \quad \text{a.s. for all } t \in [0, T]. \quad (18)$$

Notice that the state price deflator $\pi_t$ at time $t$ depends, through the adjoint variable $Y_t$, an unbounded variation process, on the entire, optimal paths $(c_s, V_s, Z_s)$ for $0 \leq s \leq t$. (One of the strengths of the stochastic maximum principle is that the Hamiltonian is allowed to depend on the state.)

Sufficient conditions for the existence of a unique solution to the stochastic maximum principle are the same as those giving existence and uniqueness of a solution to the BSDE [13].

When $\gamma = \rho$ then $Y_t = e^{-\delta t}$ for the aggregator of the conventional model, so the state price deflator is a Markov process, and dynamic programming is appropriate. If $\gamma \neq \rho$ on the other hand, we use the stochastic maximum principle in the continuous time model of this paper.

### 3.4 The derivation of the optimal consumption

Here we present the analysis for the basic version of recursive utility [11].

From the above we have the following first order conditions for this version

$$\alpha \pi_t = Y_t f_c(c^*_t, V_t), \quad (19)$$

since $\tilde{f}_c = f_c$ for the version [11]. Since $f_c(c, v) = \delta e^{-\rho}v^\rho$, it follows that the optimal consumption can be written

$$c^*_t = \left( \frac{\alpha \pi_t}{\delta Y_t} \right)^{-\frac{1}{\rho}} Y_t. \quad (20)$$

Using the notation $Z(t) = V_t \sigma_V(t)$, the dynamics of the stochastic processes involved are as follows.
\[ dV_t = \left( -\frac{\delta}{1-\rho} (c_t^*)^{1-\rho} - V_t^{1-\rho} + \frac{1}{2} \gamma V_t \sigma'_V(t) \sigma_V(t) \right) dt + V_t \sigma_V(t) dB_t, \]  

for \( 0 \leq t \leq T \), where \( V_T = 0 \). This is the backward stochastic differential equation. The dynamics of the adjoint variable is

\[ dY_t = Y_t \left\{ -\frac{\delta}{1-\rho} (1 - \rho (c_t^*)^{1-\rho} V_t^{\rho-1}) + \frac{1}{2} \gamma \sigma'_V(t) \sigma_V(t) \right\} dt 
\[ - \gamma \sigma_V(t) dB_t \right\), \]  

for \( 0 \leq t \leq T \), where \( Y_0 = 1 \). Here we have used 

\[ f_v(c, v) := \frac{\partial f(c, v)}{\partial v} = -\frac{\delta}{1-\rho} (1 - \rho c_t^* V_t^{\rho-1}). \]

Equation (22) is the adjoint equation. Finally the dynamics of the state price deflator is

\[ d\pi_t = -r_t \pi_t dt - \pi_t \eta_t dB_t, \]  

where \( \eta_t \) is the market-price-of-risk. Based on this we can derive the dynamics of the optimal consumption. For this we need the following partial derivatives:

\[ \frac{\partial c(\alpha \pi_t, V_t, Y_t)}{\partial \pi} = -\rho \left( \frac{c_t^*}{\pi_t} \right), \quad \frac{\partial c(\alpha \pi_t, V_t, Y_t)}{\partial v} = \frac{c_t^*}{V_t}, \]

\[ \frac{\partial^2 c(\alpha \pi_t, V_t, Y_t)}{\partial y^2} = \frac{1}{\rho} \left( \frac{c_t^*}{Y_t} \right), \quad \frac{\partial^2 c(\alpha \pi_t, V_t, Y_t)}{\partial y \partial v} = \frac{1}{\rho} \left( \frac{c_t^*}{\pi_t Y_t} \right), \quad \frac{\partial^2 c(\alpha \pi_t, V_t, Y_t)}{\partial \pi^2} = \frac{1}{\rho} \left( 1 + \frac{1}{\rho} \right) \left( \frac{c_t^*}{\pi_t^2} \right), \]

and

\[ \frac{\partial^2 c(\alpha \pi_t, V_t, Y_t)}{\partial v \partial y} = \frac{1}{\rho} \left( \frac{c_t^*}{\pi_t V_t} \right). \]

By the multidimensional version of Ito’s lemma we can now calculate the dynamics of the optimal consumption as follows:

\[ dc_t^* = \frac{\partial c}{\partial \pi} d\pi_t + \frac{\partial c}{\partial v} dV_t + \frac{\partial c}{\partial y} dY_t + \frac{1}{2} \frac{\partial^2 c}{\partial \pi^2} d\pi_t^2 + \frac{1}{2} \frac{\partial^2 c}{\partial v^2} dV_t^2 + \frac{1}{2} \frac{\partial^2 c}{\partial y^2} dY_t^2 
\[ + \frac{\partial^2 c}{\partial \pi \partial v} d\pi_t dV_t + \frac{\partial^2 c}{\partial \pi \partial y} d\pi_t dY_t + \frac{\partial^2 c}{\partial v \partial y} dV_t dY_t. \]

(24)
The stochastic representation for the consumption growth rate is given by
\[ \frac{dc^*_t}{c^*_t} = \mu_c(t) \, dt + \sigma_c(t) \, dB_t. \] (25)

We now use the representations for the processes \( \pi_t, V_t \) and \( Y_t \) given above. After a fair amount of routine calculations, the result is
\[ \mu_c(t) = \frac{1}{\rho} \left( r_t - \delta \right) + \frac{1}{2} \rho \left( 1 + \frac{1}{\rho} \right) \eta_t \eta_t - \frac{(\gamma - \rho)}{\rho^2} \eta_t \sigma_V(t) + \frac{1}{2} \frac{(\gamma - \rho)(1 - \rho)}{\rho^2} \sigma'_V(t) \sigma_V(t) \] (26)
and
\[ \sigma_c(t) = \frac{1}{\rho} \left( \eta_t + (\rho - \gamma) \sigma_V(t) \right). \] (27)

Here \( \sigma_V(t) \) and \( V_t \) exist as a solution to the system of the backward stochastic differential equation for \( V \).

When \( \rho = \gamma \) (or \( \gamma = 1/\psi \)), the optimal consumption dynamics for the conventional model results.

By the Doleans-Dade formula it follows that
\[ c^*_t = c_0 \, e^{\int_0^t (\mu_c(s) - \frac{1}{2} \sigma_c(s)^2) \, ds + \int_0^t \sigma_c(s) \, dB_s}. \] (28)
where \( \mu_c(t) \) and \( \sigma_c(t) \) are as determined above. This gives a characterization of the optimal consumption in terms of the primitives of the model.

From (20) and the fact that the recursive utility function we work with is homogeneous of degree one, there is a one-to-one correspondence between \( c_0 \) and \( \alpha \). Given a suitable integrability condition, for each \( c_0 > 0 \) there corresponds a unique \( \alpha_0 \) that satisfies the budget constraint with equality. Under these assumptions we have, by The Saddle Point Theorem, a complete characterization of the optimal consumption in terms of the primitives of the model.

4 Some properties of the optimal consumption

Since the agent takes the market as given, it is of interest to study how shocks to the state price \( \pi \) affect the optimal consumption. Towards this end it is convenient to rewrite the expression for the optimal consumption in terms of the state price. Using the dynamics of \( \pi \) in (5) we can write (28) as follows
\[ c^*_t = c_0 \pi_t^{\frac{1}{\rho}} e^{\int_0^t (-\frac{1}{\rho} + \frac{1}{2\rho^2} (\gamma - \rho)(1 - \gamma) \sigma'_V(s) \sigma_V(s) \, ds + \frac{1}{2}(\rho - \gamma) \int_0^t \sigma_V(s) \, dB_s}. \] (29)
In terms of the density process $\xi$ the expression is

$$c_t^* = c_0 \xi_t^{-\frac{1}{2}} e^{\int_0^t \frac{1}{2} (r_s - \delta) + \frac{1}{2} (\gamma - \rho) (1 - \gamma) \sigma'_V(s) \sigma_V(s) ds + \frac{1}{2} (\rho - \gamma) \int_0^t \sigma_V(s) dB_s}, \quad (30)$$

where

$$\pi_t = e^{-\int_0^t r_s ds} \xi_t = e^{\int_0^t r_s ds} e^{-\int_0^t \eta_s dB_s - \frac{1}{2} \int_0^t \eta'_s \eta_s ds}. $$

It is shown in Aase (2015b) that the same consumption dynamics as given in (25)-(30) result for the ordinally equivalent specification (12). Thus both asset pricing implications and optimal consumption are unaffected by a monotone transformation of recursive utility, satisfying some regularity conditions. For example is the expected optimal consumption at time $t$ as of time zero given by

$$E(c_t^*) = c_0 E\{e^{\int_0^t (\mu_c(s) ds)}\}. \quad (31)$$

When $\rho = \gamma$, or $\gamma = 1/\psi$, the optimal consumption dynamics for the conventional model results. As a direct comparison with (29) and (30) the conventional model gives

$$c_t^* = c_0 \pi_t^{-\frac{1}{2}} e^{-\frac{1}{2} \rho t} = c_0 \xi_t^{-\frac{1}{2}} e^{\int_0^t \frac{1}{2} (r_s - \delta) ds} \quad \text{(when } \rho = \gamma). \quad (32)$$

Comparing to the corresponding expressions for the conventional model ($\rho = \gamma$) we notice several important differences. Recall that the state price reflects what the consumer is willing to pay for an extra unit of consumption. In particular, with the conventional model in mind, it has been convenient to think of $\pi_t$ as high in ”times of crises” and low in ”good times”. Consider for example a ”shock” to the economy via the state price $\pi_t$. It is natural to think of this as stemming from a shock to the term $\int_0^t \eta_s dB_s$ via the process $B$. Assuming $\eta$ positive, this lowers the state price, and seen in isolation, increases optimal consumption. This is as for the conventional model. However, a shock from $B$ has also an effect on the last factor in (29). Assuming $\sigma_V$ positive, the direction of this shock depends on the sign of $(\rho - \gamma)$. When the individual prefers early resolution of uncertainty to late ($\gamma > \rho$), this shock has the opposite effect on $c_t^*$. As a consequence the individual wants to smooth shocks to the economy. More precisely, it is optimal for the consumer to smooth consumption this way provided he/she prefers early resolution of uncertainty to late. Below we show that this is also the case for the consumer who prefers late resolution of uncertainty to early; so both these types of consumers smoothen consumption.

This is obviously important when discussing optimal consumption. In more detail we have the following: The quantity $\sigma_V(t)$ turns out to be connected to the volatility of the individual’s wealth and the volatility of the
individual’s consumption volatility. In Aase (2016b) it is shown that

\[ \sigma_W(t) = (1 - \rho)\sigma_V(t) + \rho \sigma_c(t) \]  

(33)

where \( \sigma_W(t) = \varphi' \sigma_t \). This result uses homogeneity of recursive utility. This result says that the wealth of the agent depends on the individual’s preference and optimal consumption. We noticed that we may ‘invert’ this relationship to obtain

\[ \sigma_V(t) = \frac{1}{1 - \rho} \left( \sigma_W(t) - \rho \sigma_c(t) \right) \]

where the volatility of utility, one of the primitives of the model, is connected to wealth and optimal consumption of the individual. Combining the above with the result in (27), which is

\[ \sigma_c(t) = \frac{1}{\rho} \left( \eta_t + (\rho - \gamma) \sigma_V(t) \right), \]

we find that

\[ \sigma_c(t) = \frac{1 - \rho}{\rho(1 - \gamma)} \eta_t - \frac{\gamma - \rho}{\rho(1 - \gamma)} \sigma_W(t) \]  

(34)

The corresponding relationship for the expected utility model is simply \( \sigma_{EU}^c(t) = \frac{1}{\gamma} \eta_t \). The interpretation of the latter is that when there is a shock \( dB_t \) applied to the market-price-of-risk, the optimal consumption of the agent changes accordingly.

For recursive utility this is different: Recall that both the market-price-of-risk process \( \eta_t \), and the agent’s wealth volatility \( \sigma_W(t) \) are positive. If the sign of \( \frac{1 - \rho}{\rho(1 - \gamma)} \) is the same as the sign of \( \frac{\gamma - \rho}{\rho(1 - \gamma)} \), the recursive utility agent will smoothen consumption using wealth, while the expected utility maximizer is only exposed to market variations. We summarize as follows:

**Theorem 1** The individual with recursive utility will prefer a consumption plan that smoothens market shocks relative to the expected utility maximizer provided (i) \( \gamma > \rho \) and \( \rho < 1 \), or (ii) \( \gamma < \rho \) and \( \rho > 1 \).

Equation (34) can be interpreted to mean that the agent uses wealth to stabilize the volatility of the optimal consumption in response to changes in the market conditions, something the expected utility maximizer is unable to do.

This result can also be seen to resolve a serious problem with the standard equilibrium model with expected utility and several agents: According to the mutuality principle, they all act in the same manner to market shocks. However, this can not be consistent with an equilibrium, since all will be either sellers, or buyers. After each shock, the economy is out of equilibrium,
and the Lucas (1978)-model only attempt to describe what happens after an equilibrium has been resettled.

With recursive utility this is different, since market shocks affect agents differently depending upon the preference parameters. This is analyzed in a model with several agents in Aase (2015). Some of the conventional wisdom has to be rewritten in presence of recursive utility.

The investment strategy that attains the optimal consumption of the agent is presented later for the life cycle model. This result shows how the agent can obtain the optimal consumption path, by consuming and investing for future consumption.

The recursive agent does not behave myopically, in contrast looks at several periods at the time. When times are good the agent consumes less than the myopic agent, invests more for the future, and can hence enjoy higher consumption than the expected utility maximizer when times are bad. This results in a stable consumption path, not only exposed to market variations as for the expected utility maximizer.

4.1 The consumption puzzle

Recursive utility separates time preference from risk preference, and permits the individual to care about the time when uncertainty is resolved, unlike the conventional, additive and separable expected utility representation. At each time \( t \) this agent cares about future utility in addition to current consumption.

Part of the asset pricing and consumption puzzles is related to the following question: How can the per capita consumption be so smooth at such a relatively large expected growth rate as indicated by market data?

The first major problem with the conventional life cycle model is to explain the smooth path of the consumption growth rate in society. The volatility of this growth rate in (27) can be made arbitrarily small when \( \eta_t \approx (\gamma - \rho)\sigma_Y(t) \). In contrast, for the conventional model only the first term on the right-hand side is present. For the estimated value of \( \eta_t \), this requires a very large value of \( \gamma \) to match the low estimate for the consumption growth rate volatility. In the recursive model this can be readily explained.

The second major problem with the conventional model is to explain the relatively large estimate of the expected growth rate of consumption in society for plausible values of the parameters. For the estimated value of \( \eta_t \), and the large value of \( \gamma \) required to match the low estimated volatility, this requires a very low, even negative, value of the impatience rate \( \delta \) in the conventional model to match the estimate of the (conditional) expected consumption growth rate.
With the growth rate given by (26) instead, this is different. Here $\rho$ takes the place of $\gamma$ in the two first terms, which are present also in the conventional model. Thus it is consumption substitution, not risk aversion that is the correct interpretation here. Furthermore, by inspection of the the forth term on the right-hand side in (26), it is clear that a large consumption growth rate is possible. Two obvious cases are when $\gamma > \rho$ and $\rho < 1$, and $\gamma < \rho$ and $\rho > 1$, depending of course on the term $\sigma_V(t)$. In the latter case also the third term on the right-hand side of (26) can be sufficiently large. In the former this term puts a limit on how much larger than $\rho$ the risk aversion $\gamma$ can be in order to match the estimated value of the growth rate.

Also the fist major problem is well explained by Theorem 1 above. Where the expected utility consumer just follows is the wake of others, the contents of the mutuality principle applied to the present situation, living each period as if it were the last one, the recursive individual displays a more sophisticated behavior under market uncertainty as time goes. It may depend on whether the individual has preference for early, or late resolution of uncertainty. In both cases the individual may choose to smoothen shocks to the economy and thereby obtains a less volatile consumption path.

Different types of recursive utility maximizers also react differently on market shocks. Without going into details, as a consequence the mutuality principle does not hold when these different types populate the economy. They all take expectations about the future into account when making consumption and investment decisions. All this is of importance for decision making, including deciding on optimal pensions. Some of the conventional wisdom has to be rewritten in presence of recursive utility.

The investment strategy that attains the optimal consumption of the agent is presented in Section 6. The recursive agent does not behave myopically, in contrast looks at several periods at the time. When times are good the agent consumes less than the myopic agent, invests more for the future, and can hence enjoy higher consumption than the expected utility maximizer when times are bad. This results in a stable consumption path, not only exposed to market variations as for the expected utility maximizer.

5 Optimal pension insurance

Returning to the life cycle model, let us consider pensions. Towards this end, let $T_x$ be the remaining life time of a person who entered into a pension contract at age $x$. Let $[0, \tau]$ be the support of $T_x$. In a world with no market uncertainty and only biometric risk, the single premium of an annuity paying one unit per unit of time as long as the pensioner is alive is given by the
formula
\[ \tilde{a}^{(r)}_x = E\left( \int_0^{T_x} 1 e^{-rt} dt \right) = \int_0^{\tau} e^{-rt} P(T_x > t) dt, \]  \hspace{1cm} (35)

where \( r \) is the short term interest rate, and \( P(T_x > t) := \frac{l_{x+t}}{l_x} \) in actuarial notation, where \( l_x \) is the so-called 'decrement function'. Notice how a random horizon translates into multiplication with the survival probability for continuous payment streams. This we make use below.

Likewise, the single premium of a "temporary annuity" which terminates after time \( n \) is
\[ \tilde{a}^{(r)}_{x;\tilde{n}} = \int_0^n e^{-rt} \frac{l_{x+t}}{l_x} dt. \]  \hspace{1cm} (36)

The problem with pension insurance is to solve
\[ \sup_{c \in L^+} E\left( \int_0^{\tau} f(c_t, V_t, Z_t) P(T_x > t) dt \right) \]
subject to the budget constraint
\[ E\left\{ \int_0^{\tau} c_t \pi_t P(T_x > t) dt \right\} \leq E\left\{ \int_0^{\tau} e_t \pi_t P(T_x > t) dt \right\}. \]

Comparing this problem to the one with a fixed horizon \( T \), the difference is just the survival probability, since the horizon \( \tau \) is also fixed. In the first order conditions, whether we use directional derivatives or the stochastic maximum principle, this means that the survival probability will appear on both sides of the equation, and thus cancel. The dependence on the random life time will, however, reenter through the budget constraint.

Consider the following income process \( e_t \):
\[ e_t = \begin{cases} y, & \text{if } t \leq n; \\ 0, & \text{if } t > n \end{cases} \]  \hspace{1cm} (37)

Here \( y \) is a constant, interpreted as the consumer’s salary when working, and \( n \) is the time of retirement for a pension insurance buyer, who initiated a pension insurance contract in age \( x \). Equality in the budget constraint can then be written
\[ E\left( \int_0^{\tau} (e_t - c_t^*) \pi_t P(T_x > t) dt \right) = 0. \]

which is \textbf{The Principle of Equivalence} in the actuarial sciences.

Optimal pensions in the life cycle model with recursive utility goes as follows: From our result (29) on optimal consumption, the optimal life time
consumption \((t \in [0,n])\) and pension \((t \in [n,\tau])\) is
\[
c_t^* = y \frac{\tilde{a}_{x:n}^{(r)}}{\tilde{a}_x} \exp \left\{ \left( \frac{1}{\rho} (r - \delta) + \frac{1}{2 \rho} \eta^2 + \frac{1}{2 \rho} (\gamma - \rho) (1 - \gamma) \sigma_V^2 \right) t \right\}
+ \frac{1}{\rho} \left( \eta + (\rho - \gamma) \sigma_V \right) B_t \}, \tag{38}
\]
provided the agent is alive at time \(t\) (otherwise \(c_t^* = 0\)). Here the risk adjusted interest rate \(\hat{r}\) is given by
\[
\hat{r} = r - \frac{1}{\rho} (r - \delta) + \frac{1}{2 \rho} (1 - \frac{1}{\rho}) \eta' \eta + \frac{1}{\rho} \left( \frac{1}{\rho} - 1 \right) (\rho - \gamma) \eta \sigma_V
- \frac{1}{\rho} (\gamma - \rho) \left( \frac{1}{\rho} (\gamma - \rho) + \frac{1}{2} (1 - \gamma) \right) \sigma_V^2. \tag{39}
\]
We notice that the main difference from the optimal consumption solution with a fixed horizon consists in the factor \(y \frac{\tilde{a}_{x:n}^{(r)}}{\tilde{a}_x} \exp \left\{ \left( \frac{1}{\rho} (r - \delta) + \frac{1}{2 \rho} \eta^2 + \frac{1}{2 \rho} (\gamma - \rho) (1 - \gamma) \sigma_V^2 \right) t \right\}
+ \frac{1}{\rho} \left( \eta + (\rho - \gamma) \sigma_V \right) B_t \}, \tag{38}
\]
which is where mortality enters. This factor equals \(\alpha^{-\frac{1}{\hat{r}} - \gamma} = c_0\), determined by equality in the budget constraint.

The premium intensity is given by the \(F_t\)-adapted process \(p_t := y - c_t^*\).

As can be seen, the optimal pension with recursive utility is being "smoothed" in the same manner as the optimal consumption, summarized in Proposition 1.

When the risk adjusted interest rate \(\hat{r} > r\), the factor \(\frac{\tilde{a}_{x:n}^{(r)}}{\tilde{a}_x} \exp \left\{ \left( \frac{1}{\rho} (r - \delta) + \frac{1}{2 \rho} \eta^2 + \frac{1}{2 \rho} (\gamma - \rho) (1 - \gamma) \sigma_V^2 \right) t \right\}
+ \frac{1}{\rho} \left( \eta + (\rho - \gamma) \sigma_V \right) B_t \}, \tag{38}
\]
is larger than in the case when these two interest rates are equal to the short rate \(r\). As a consequence, the pension benefit \(c_t^*\) is larger in a situation with market uncertainty, than in a world with no market for risky securities. This is natural, since in the former case the pension reserve is invested in the securities market, giving a better expected rate of return than the risk free rate, which naturally should benefit the pensioners.

As explained above, the wealth and consumption characteristics of the agent is connected to the preferences via \(\sigma_V(t) = \frac{1}{1 - \rho} (\sigma_W(t) - \rho \sigma_c(t))\). This relationship is quite natural since obviously the agent’s wealth will influence the optimal savings, and hence the agent’s pension (Aase (2016b).

In the life cycle model we summarize as follows:

**Theorem 2** Under the same assumptions as in Theorem 1, the individual with recursive utility will prefer a pension plan that smoothens market shocks relative to the standard model provided (i) \(\gamma > \rho\) and \(\rho < 1\), or (ii) \(\gamma < \rho\) and \(\rho > 1\).
This result points in the direction of defined benefit (DB) pension plan rather than a defined contribution (DC) plan as the optimal form of pension insurance, for both early and late resolvers of uncertainty.

For the standard Eu-model where $\rho = \gamma$, the optimal life time consumption ($t \in [0, n]$) and pension ($t \in [n, \tau]$) is

$$c^*_t = y \frac{\tilde{a}^{(r)}_{x,\tilde{r}}}{\tilde{a}_x} \exp \left\{ \left( \frac{1}{\gamma} (r - \delta) + \frac{1}{2 \rho} \eta^2 \right) t + \frac{1}{\gamma} \eta B_t \right\}, \quad (40)$$

provided the agent is alive at time $t$ (otherwise $c^*_t = 0$). The initial value $c_0$ is then

$$c_0 = y \frac{\tilde{a}^{(r)}_{x,\tilde{r}}}{\tilde{a}_x}$$

where

$$\tilde{r} = r - \frac{1}{\rho} (r - \delta) + \frac{1}{2} \frac{1}{\gamma} (1 - \frac{1}{\gamma}) \eta' \eta. \quad (41)$$

The premium intensity $p_t$ at time $t$ while working is given by $p_t = y - c^*_t$, an $\mathcal{F}_t$-adapted process. This shows that the same conclusions hold for the optimal pension as with optimal consumption with regard to the sensitivity of stock market uncertainty, i.e., the mutuality principle holds for pensions with expected utility; all the pensioners are affected in the same direction from a market shock.

This model may be taken as support for unit linked pension insurance, or, DC-plans. Here all the financial risk resides with the customers.

We find this at odds with the major task of the insurance industry, namely to carry aggregate risk on behalf of the public. In life and pension insurance industry, this means both biometric risk and market risk.

Let us here recall the principle result from the theory of syndicates. In a Pareto optimum, the risk tolerance of the syndicate is equal to the sum of the risk tolerances of all its members. An insurance company can be interpreted as a syndicate, in particular a mutual company. Clearly the risk carrying capacity of a life and pension insurance company is much larger than than of any of its policy holders.

This lesson seems to be forgotten these days.

### 6 Portfolio choice with recursive utility

We now address the optimal investment strategy that the recursive utility consumer will use in order to obtain the optimal consumption.
Consider an agent with recursive utility who takes the market introduced in Section 2 as given. In this setting we now analyze optimal portfolio choice. We then have the following result:

**Theorem 3** The optimal portfolio fractions in the risky assets are given by
\[
\varphi(t) = \frac{1 - \rho}{\gamma - \rho}(\sigma_t\sigma_t')^{-1}\nu_t - \frac{\rho(1 - \gamma)}{\gamma - \rho}(\sigma_t\sigma_t')^{-1}(\sigma_t\sigma^*_c(t)),
\]
(42)
assuming $\gamma \neq \rho$.

**Proof:** First we recall the dynamics of the optimal consumption for the individual investor under consideration. The volatility $\sigma_c^*(t)$ has been shown in (27) of Section 3.4 to be
\[
\sigma_c^*(t) = \frac{1}{\rho}(\eta_t + (\rho - \gamma)\sigma_V(t)),
\]
(43)
where $\sigma_t\eta_t = \nu_t$ is the market-price-of-risk given in Section 2. Also, the volatility of utility is given by
\[
\sigma_V(t) = \frac{1}{1 - \rho}(\sigma_t\varphi_t - \rho\sigma_c^*),
\]
(44)
as shown in Aase (2016b). This leads to a single equation for $\varphi_t$, and the solution is given by the formula (42) when $\gamma \neq \rho$. □

Notice that this proof only works for recursive utility when $\gamma \neq \rho$. Unless this is the case, the term with $\sigma_V(t)$ in (43) drops out, and this is the term that contains $\sigma_W(t)$ (see (44)), meaning that the term containing the portfolio rations $\varphi(t)$ drops out of the equation when $\gamma = \rho$. In the latter case, however, the answer is well known from the literature.

At the beginning of each period, the agent allocates a certain proportion of wealth to immediate consumption, and then invests the remaining amount in the available securities for future consumption. Accordingly, the optimal portfolio choice will depend on consumption, unlike for the expected utility model.

The growth rate of consumption, and its conditional variance, is known once consumption is determined. This is achieved by the agent using his/her preferences faced with the various market opportunities.

The agent first determines the optimal consumption growth rate and then the optimal portfolio choice, in such a manner that the relationship in Proposition 3 holds.

The optimal fractions with recursive utility depend on both risk aversion and time preference as well as the market-price-of-risk and risk premiums.
They also depend, although only indirectly, on the volatility of utility $\sigma_V(t)$ and various covariances with the market portfolio. And, unlike the expected utility mode, they depend on the consumption decision taken before the optimal portfolio choice is made.

As can be seen from the relationship (20), the agent determines optimal consumption based on preferences, future utility $V_t$, and the quantity $Y_t$ which depends on preferences and the past consumption and utility history of the agent, which can be seen from equation (17). If done optimally, equation (42) holds.

In each period the agent both consumes and invests for future consumption. Compared to the expected utility consumer, the recursive agent consumes less in good times, and then invests more for future consumption, and vice versa in bad times. This is how this agent averages consumption across time and states of the world in a more efficient manner than the conventional expected utility agent.

As we have seen, the recursive utility maximizer considers more than one period at the time, which allows for a smoother consumption path than the expected utility maximizer can achieve, who is just myopic.

Based on the conventional, pure demand theory of this paper, by assuming a relative risk aversion of around two, the optimal fraction in equity is 119% follows from the standard formula $\varphi = \frac{1}{\gamma} \left( \frac{\sigma_R \sigma_R'}{\nu} \right) - 1$ (see Mossin (1968), Merton (1971), Samuelson (1969)), using the summary statistics of Table 1, and assuming one single risky asset, represented by the index itself. In contrast, depending upon estimates, the typical American household holds between 6% to 20% in equity during the period of this data set. Conditional on participating in the stock market, this number increases to about 40% in financial assets. Recent estimates predict close to 60%, including indirect holdings via pension funds invested in the stock market. In the above application this formula reduces to $\varphi = \frac{1}{\gamma} \left( \frac{\sigma_R \sigma_R'}{\mu_R - r} \right)$, where $R$ is the risky asset, here assumed equal to the market $M$. Notice that here $\gamma = \rho$.

One could object to this that the conventional model is consistent with a value for $\gamma$ around 26 only. Using this value instead, the optimal fraction in equity is down to around 9%, which in isolation seems reasonable enough. However, such a high value for the relative risk aversion is considered implausible, as discussed before.

As an illustration of the general, recursive utility based formula of Proposition 3, consider the standard situation with one risky and one risk-free asset, letting the S&P-500 index represent the risky security, and employ the data of Table 1 in the same manner as indicated above. Here we may use the estimate for the optimal consumption growth rate in Table 1, as a consistency
check of the theory.

With these assumptions, the recursive model explains an average of 13 per cent in risky securities for the following values of the preference parameters: \( \gamma = 2.6 \) and \( \rho = .90 \). Given participation in the stock market, when \( \varphi = .40 \), this is consistent with \( \gamma = 2.2 \) and \( \rho = .76 \). If \( \varphi = .60 \), this may correspond to \( \gamma = 2.0 \) and \( \rho = .66 \), etc., a potential resolution of this puzzle.

The standard formula based on expected utility also results when there is no intermediate consumption. In this situation the expected utility model has a better axiomatic support, since consumption only takes place at the last point in time (see e.g., Mossin (1969)). According to Mossin (1968), his excuse for leaving out intermediate consumption was that of "taking one thing at the time". However, taking this case seriously for the moment, in this situation \( \sigma^*_t(t) = 0 \) in our model, and the corresponding recursive formula takes the form

$$\varphi(t) = \frac{1 - \rho}{\gamma - \rho} \left( \sigma_t \sigma'_t \right)^{-1} \nu_t. \quad (45)$$

From this we notice that when \( \rho = 0 \), the standard expected utility formula results. This points to the requirements under which this latter formula obtains in the 'bigger' model: The agent must be neutral with respect to consumption substitution across time.

Notice also how the formula (45) explains the empirical facts mentioned above: For any value of \( \gamma > \rho \), the factor \( (1 - \rho)/(\gamma - \rho) \) can be as small as we please by setting \( \rho \) close enough to 1 from below. So this formula can, e.g., explain 13\% in equities for very reasonable values of \( \gamma \) and \( \rho \), where \( \gamma > \rho \) and \( \rho < 1 \).

In addition to the insurance industry, other interesting applications would be to management of funds that invests public wealth to the benefits of the citizens of a country, or the members of a society. If these organizations happen to be large enough for an estimate of the volatility of the consumption growth rate of the group is available, the applicability of the present model becomes particularly simple, since we can then use the expression (42). This is of course a formal use of this result. One such example is the Norwegian Government Pension Fund Global (formerly the Norwegian Petroleum Fund).

7 Summary

For the conventional model with additive and separable utility risk aversion and intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption sometimes play conflicting roles when discussing optimal consumption. We propose to look
at a wider class of utility functions, recursive utility, to sort out some of these problems.

We show that the recursive utility customer finds it optimal to smooth market shocks to a larger extent than the conventional model predicts. One question is then how this can be accomplished in the real world. This is of great importance when analyzing pensions and life insurance contracts, where insuring consumers against adverse shocks in the market should be a main issue. After the financial crisis in 2008, insurers seem eager to pass all or most of the financial risk to its customers, presenting them with mainly defined contribution pension plans, or unit linked plans. The lessons from the present paper for the insurance industry is clear: To provide the kind of consumption smoothing that consumers of the last century seem to prefer, which points in the direction of defined benefit rather than defined contribution, or unit linked pension plans.

It follows from our model how aggregate consumption in society can be as smooth as implied by data, and at the same time be consistent with the relatively large, observed growth rate. Since the recursive model fits market data much more convincingly than the conventional model, this leaves more credibility to the former representation, and weight to our recommendation.

References


