



AFIR **MUNICH**
LIFE 2009

Economic Values of Contribution Cashflows and Measures to Bring the EVs under Control

September 11, 2009

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1-1. Covariance pricing formula

$$q = \frac{E(\mathbf{v})}{R_F} + \text{COV}(\xi, \mathbf{v})$$

- A cashflow increasing in market downturn and decreasing in market upturn correlates positively to the state price density.
- The second term thus becomes positive.

1-2. Evaluation of employer contributions

- **The EV of employer contributions would be evaluated higher than their best-estimated PV.**
- **The greater the volatility of contributions is, the higher the EV of the contributions is evaluated.**

1-3. In the case of benefit cashflows

$$q = \frac{E(v)}{R_F + \delta}$$

- The risk premium delta with regard to the benefit volatility originated from the beta risk of investments should be positive.
- The risk premium delta with regard to the benefit volatility originated from the *macro* longevity risk should be negative.

2. A benefit design sustainable under the 'Japan Scenario'

if $L^{(1)} \leq A$, then $B = B^{(1)}$

if $A = L^{(0)} + \alpha (L^{(1)} - L^{(0)})$ ($0 \leq \alpha < 1$) ,

then $B = B^{(0)} + \alpha (B^{(1)} - B^{(0)})$

if $A < L^{(0)}$, then $B = B^{(0)}$

- **B(0) and B(1) are both indexed to inflation.**
- **The portion exceeding L(0) functions as a virtual risk buffer.**

3-1. A serious deficiency in DB plans

- **No specific correspondence between individual liabilities and plan assets**
- **As a result,**
 - **the interests of beneficiaries are given the most privileged status.**
 - **no effective and timely mechanism of keeping under control the risks of active participants is incorporated.**

3-2. Framework of the payout-year-specific (PYS) funding standard

- **Divide contributions by payout year**
- **Load the decomposed contributions on the ‘*sequentially chained containers*’**
- **And assign each container**
 - **a payout year, and**
 - **a minimum permissible funding ratio**

3-3. Partial ring-fencing of assets

- **The assets can only be used for paying benefits in the year assigned to the container.**
- **A surplus may be used for filling up the shortfalls of other containers**
 - **a kind of *intertemporal* risk-sharing**
- **But cannot fill up a shortfall with aggravating deficiencies of other containers.**

3-4. How to decompose contributions

- **Naturally given by discounting back the accrued benefits using appropriate discount rates**
- **Then, how to determine the *appropriate* discount rates for each container?**
- **The gist of payout-year-specific (PYS) funding standard lies in this point!**

3-5. Using the expected return of the actual portfolio in not prudent

$$dA_u = r A_u du + \sigma A_u dW_u \quad u \in [t, T]$$

$$A_t = L_T \exp\{-r(T-t)\}$$

Then,

$$P(A_T > L_T) = N\left(-\frac{1}{2}\sigma\sqrt{T-t}\right)$$

4-1. Main ideas of the PYS standard (1/2)

P1= the probability that the portfolio value will attain the liability value at some time

P0= probability that the portfolio value will surpass the liability value at the year of maturity

Then,

$$P1 > P0$$

4-1. Main ideas of the PYS standard (2/2)

- Assume switching to a liability-hedging portfolio at the time of hitting the upper barrier, not waiting the year of maturity
- Determine the maximum discount rate so as to satisfy the condition:
 - $P1 > p1$ (given from outside)
- Need to evaluate P1

4-2. The probability of hitting the upper barrier (1/4)

$$dA_u = r A_u du + \sigma A_u dW_u \quad u \in [t, T]$$

$$A_t = L^{(1)} \exp\{-(\mu \theta_t + r_F)(T - t)\}$$

$$\mu = r - r_F$$

$$dB_u = r_F B_u du \quad u \in [t, T]$$

$$B_t = L^{(1)} \exp\{-r_F (T - t)\}$$

4-2. The probability of hitting the upper barrier (2/4)

$$X_u = \log \frac{A_u}{B_u}$$

Then,

$$dX_u = \left(\mu - \frac{1}{2} \sigma^2 \right) dt + \sigma dW_u$$

$$X_t = \alpha_t = -\mu \theta_t (T - t) < 0$$

4-2. The probability of hitting the upper barrier (3/4)

Consider a *running maximum process*:

$$M_X(u) = \sup_{t \leq s \leq u} X_s$$

$F_{M(u)}(x)$: the distribution function

Then, probability P1 is given by:

$$P_1 = 1 - F_{M(T)}(0)$$

4-2. The probability of hitting the upper barrier (4/4)

$$F_{M(u)}(x) = N \left(\frac{(x - \alpha_t) - (\mu - \frac{1}{2}\sigma^2)(u - t)}{\sigma \sqrt{u - t}} \right) - \exp \left\{ 2 \frac{(\mu - \frac{1}{2}\sigma^2)(x - \alpha_t)}{\sigma^2} \right\} N \left(- \frac{(x - \alpha_t) + (\mu - \frac{1}{2}\sigma^2)(u - t)}{\sigma \sqrt{u - t}} \right)$$

5. Additional conditions (1/6)

- **Condition $P1 > p1$ only determines the maximum proportion θ_t of the excess return $\mu = r - r_F$**
 - for each combination of excess return and its volatility
- **Another condition has to be introduced, especially from the aspect of restricting the risk of underfunding**
 - to determine unique discount rates

5. Additional conditions (2/6)

- (1) Restricting the severity of loss when the portfolio value could not attain the liability value at any time
- (2) The conditional expectation of the portfolio value at the year of maturity is within an affordable range:

$$\frac{E[A_T | A_T < L^{(0)}]}{L^{(0)}} \geq q, \quad 0 < q < 1$$

5. Additional conditions (3/6)

(3) Probability P2 that the log funded ratio is absorbed into the lower barrier at some time is less than constant p2.

$$dC_u = r_F C_u du \quad u \in [t, T]$$

$$C_t = L^{(0)} \exp\{-r_F (T - t)\}$$

5. Additional conditions (4/6)

$$Y_u = \log \frac{A_u}{C_u}$$

$$dY_u = \left(\mu - \frac{1}{2} \sigma^2 \right) du + \sigma dW_u$$

$$Y_t = \beta_t = -\mu \theta_t (T - t) + \log \left(\frac{L^{(1)}}{L^{(0)}} \right) > 0$$

5. Additional conditions (5/6)

Consider a *running minimum process*:

$$m_Y(u) = \inf_{t \leq s \leq u} Y_s$$

$F_{m(u)}(y)$: the distribution function

Then, probability P2 is given by:

$$P_2 = F_{m(u)}(0)$$

5. Additional conditions (6/6)

$$\begin{aligned}
 F_{m(u)}(y) = & N \left(\frac{(y - \beta_t) - (\mu - \frac{1}{2}\sigma^2)(u - t)}{\sigma\sqrt{u - t}} \right) \\
 & + \exp \left\{ 2 \frac{(\mu - \frac{1}{2}\sigma^2)(y - \beta_t)}{\sigma^2} \right\} N \left(\frac{(y - \beta_t) + (\mu - \frac{1}{2}\sigma^2)(u - t)}{\sigma\sqrt{u - t}} \right)
 \end{aligned}$$

6-1. Maximum permissible proportions of excess returns --- condition_(2)

$L^{(1)} / L^{(0)}$	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
$T - t$	10	10	10	20	20	20	5	5	5
p_1	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.70
q	0.80	0.90	0.95	0.80	0.70	0.60	0.80	0.90	0.95
w_t	0.74	0.35	0.17	0.57	0.91	1.26	0.94	0.46	0.23
θ_t	0.49	0.50	0.51	0.44	0.40	0.40	0.69	0.62	0.60
r_P	7.40	6.29	5.66	6.97	7.81	8.45	7.88	6.63	5.85
$\exp\{(r_P - r_F)(T - t)\}$	0.79	0.88	0.94	0.67	0.57	0.50	0.87	0.92	0.96
$\exp\{\alpha_t\}$	0.89	0.94	0.97	0.84	0.80	0.76	0.90	0.95	0.97

6-2. Maximum permissible proportions of excess returns --- condition_(3)

$L^{(1)} / L^{(0)}$	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.50
$T - t$	10	10	10	20	20	20	5	5	5
p_1	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.70
p_2	0.20	0.30	0.40	0.20	0.30	0.40	0.20	0.30	0.40
w_t	0.68	0.80	0.92	0.48	0.56	0.64	0.92	1.09	1.27
θ_t	0.49	0.49	0.50	0.46	0.44	0.43	0.69	0.73	0.79
r_P	7.25	7.55	7.84	6.68	6.91	7.14	7.84	8.18	8.47
$\exp\{(r_P - r_F)(T - t)\}$	0.80	0.77	0.75	0.71	0.68	0.65	0.87	0.85	0.84
$\exp\{\alpha_t\}$	0.90	0.88	0.87	0.86	0.84	0.83	0.91	0.89	0.87
$\exp\{\beta_t\}$	1.34	1.32	1.30	1.29	1.27	1.25	1.36	1.34	1.31

6-3. Implications for discount rates

- The discount rates thus determined include a proportion of the expected excess return.
- The proportion increases progressively as the period until maturity extends.
 - but only if acceptable risk also increases
- The graph of the proportion might be hump-shaped
 - if there is a due limit on acceptable risks

6-4. Implications for funding standards

- Pension funds may take larger investment risks as investment horizon extends
 - but only when funding deficiencies can be corrected gradually spending longer periods
- Any funding standard should strike a right balance between
 - A) assuring stable employer contributions with reasonable prices, and
 - B) ensuring that targeted benefits are paid with reasonably high probabilities

6-5. Implications for investment strategies

- Any portfolio is considered as a composite of target date funds (TDFs).
 - irrespective of the funding standards
- Decomposition of a portfolio by payout year makes the discussion on investment horizons extremely transparent.
- Any portfolio should be rebalanced along with the changes in benefit cashflow estimation and the degree of risk aversion
 - even if the prospect on the market is invariant

7. Concluding remarks

- **Any funding standard cannot continue to exist without paying proper consideration to investments and *vice versa*.**
- **The PYS funding standard is a bridge connecting the financing issues and investment issues systematically.**