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France

IMMUNISATION CONTRE LE
RISQUE DE TAUX D'INTERET PAR
LA PROGRAMMATION LINEAIRE
- UNE METHODE SANS RISQUE

224 **IMMUNISATION CONTRE LE RISQUE DE TAUX D'INTERET PAR LA
PROGRAMMATION LINEAIRE - UNE METHODE SANS RISQUE**

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RESUME

Les auteurs proposent une méthode sans risque pour assurer la couverture du flux de trésorerie d'un contrat à terme donné, en utilisant un nombre restreint d'actifs. La méthode est sans risque en ce sens que le taux d'intérêt est supposé suivre un scénario de pire cas. Elle est fondée sur la programmation linéaire et donne une courbe des taux endogène, comme solution du problème inverse. Les applications possibles sont la titrisation et essentiellement les réaménagements d'engagements.

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ABSTRACT :

We propose a **riskfree** method to hedge a given future cash stream using a **restricted number of assets**. The method is riskfree in the sense that the interest rate is assumed to follow a worst case **scenario**. It is based on linear programming and we find an **endogenous yield curve** as a solution of the dual **problem**. **Potential** applications are securitization and in substance defeasance.

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1. INTRODUCTION

A **fixed income liability**, or asset, can be represented by a **sequence** of negative, or positive, deterministic **cash-flows**. The **present** value of such cash-flows **could** easily be **computed** using **ad hoc zero-coupon** bonds if they existed for every **maturity**. **One would** simply duplicate each **cash-flow** by a **zero-coupon** bond. The given **sequence of** cash-flows thereby **generates** a portfolio of **zero-coupons**, the **market** value of which gives the present value of the liability.

Since the **zero-coupon** portfolio perfectly duplicates the given **sequence of** cash-flows, its holder will always **be** able to **finance** the liability, regardless of the particular path the interest rates follow. In the real world, unfortunately, it will usually be impossible to duplicate the liability **with the** assets that happen to be available. However, it may **still** be **possible** to construct a **portfolio** that enables its holder to **finance** the given liability in every **conceivable** circumstance.

For this purpose, we envision the situation as a game between the **market**, on the **one** hand, and the portfolio holder, **on** the other. The market fixes the path **of** interest rates, subject to the **restriction** that they do not rise above some prescribed r_{\max} nor fall below some other value r_{\min} . The other player chooses his portfolio among available assets. We then **define** the present value of the liability to be the min-max value of the game, that is, the lowest value of a portfolio which will enable its holder to **finance** the liability whatever the path of interest rates. As the reader will **see**, determining this value then boils down to a problem in linear programming.

In other words, we assume that the **holder of** the portfolio always faces a **worst-case scenario**, that is, that **whenever** he has to borrow, he borrows at the highest r_{\max} , and **whenever** he lends, he does so at the lowest rate r_{\min} . Therefore, provided the **interest rates remain between** r_{\min} and r_{\max} the immunization is absolute. We, in fact, compute **an** upper bound for **the** cost of the service of the liability.

As a solution of the dual of the optimization problem we solve, we find an **endogenous** shadow yield curve. **This** yield curve depends on r_{\max} but also on the **pool** of assets selected to finance the liability.

A test of the robustness of our results is the evaluation of the incidence of changes in r_{\min} and r_{\max} **on the** outputs.

Our basic motivation for this work is of course immunization, either to **perform an** insubstance **defeance**, or to securitize **assets**. We computed an **actual** example and summarized the results in the appendix.

a) Notation

The assets, or liabilities, cash-flows which are assumed to continue for n **days**, are represented by **n-dimensional column** vectors, the i -th element being the cash flow at date i .

We let $S = (s_1, \dots, s_n)$ represent the liability the holder has to **finance using** p available

market **assets** with prices $\rho^1, \dots, \rho^i, \dots, \rho^p$ and cash flows e^i_j for the i -th **asset** at **date** $j, i=1 \dots p, j = 1 \dots n$.

Set :

$$E^i = (e^i_1, \dots, e^i_n) \in \mathbb{R}^n \text{ for } i = 1, \dots, p$$

$E = (E^1, \dots, E^i, \dots, E^p)$ the $n \times p$ matrix of cash flows

$$p = (\rho^1, \dots, \rho^i, \dots, \rho^p) \in \mathbb{R}^p$$

We **assume** that the holder *can* buy any proportion α^i ($0 \leq \alpha^i < 1$) of the i -th **asset** E^i at price $\alpha^i \rho^i$. The corresponding cash flows are then : $\alpha^i E^i = (e^i_1 \alpha^i, \dots, e^i_n \alpha^i)$. In **reality** there are N^i indivisible **unit assets** available in the **market** with cash flows E^i/N^i and price ρ^i/N^i : the numbers N^i are supposed large enough to **consider** α^i as a continuous variable. On the other hand the amounts E^i are chosen small enough to have a negligible effect on the market prices.

In order to complete the markets, we also assume that the holder of the portfolio is able to lend (or borrow) any amount q_i (or q'_i when **borrowing**) between the $(i-1)$ th and the i -th **day** of the period with return $a_i = 1 + r_{\min}$ ($a_i a'_i = 1 + r_{\max}$ when borrowing) for $i = 1, \dots, n$. That is to say that she always faces the worst **situation** : the **lowest** possible interest rate when lending and the highest when **borrowing**.

The corresponding cash cash flows are represented f a the date. $i = 2, \dots, n$ by column vectors of \mathbb{R}^n :

$$q_i d_i = q_i (0, \dots, 0, -1, a_i, 0, \dots, 0)$$

$$q'_i d'_i = q'_i (0, \dots, 0, +1, -a'_i, 0, \dots, 0)$$

Where the -1 (or the +1) is the $(i-1)$ th coordinate.

At date $i = 1$, the cash flows vectors are :

$$q_1 d_1 = q_1 (a_1, 0, \dots, 0)$$

$$q'_1 d'_1 = q'_1 (-a'_1, 0, \dots, 0)$$

but the holder will have to pay at date 0 the amounts q_1 and $-q'_1$ respectively to include those cash flows in the portfolio. By convention, positive flows **correspond** to receiving cash and negative flows to paying out.

As a_i is the worst possible return on a lending and a'_i the highest possible yield on a borrowing :

$$1 < a_i < a'_i \text{ for } i = 1, \dots, n.$$

A **strategy** $(\alpha^1, \dots, \alpha^p, q_1, \dots, q_n, q'_1, \dots, q'_n)$ consist of buying the proportions α^j of **assets** E^j for $j = 1, \dots, p$ and lending (or borrowing) the amounts q_i (or q'_i when **borrowing**) between dates $i-1$ and i for $i = 1, \dots, n$.

b) Admissible strategies

A strategy $(\alpha^1, \dots, \alpha^p, q_1, \dots, q_n, q'_1, \dots, q'_n)$ is *admissible* if :

$$0 \leq \alpha^i \leq 1 \quad i = 1, \dots, p$$

$$0 \leq q_i \quad i = 1, \dots, n$$

$$0 \leq q'_i \quad i = 1, \dots, n$$

$$S = \sum_{(i=1, \dots, p)} \alpha^i E^i + \sum_{(i=1, \dots, n)} q_i d_i + \sum_{(i=1, \dots, n)} q'_i d'_i \quad (1)$$

that is the holder adopting an admissible strategy exactly finances the liability at every date 1, ..., n when facing the worst case interest rate scenario, and therefore when facing any interest rate scenario.

c) A linear programming problem

The total cost at date 0 of an admissible strategy $(\alpha^1, \dots, \alpha^p, q_1, \dots, q_n, q'_1, \dots, q'_n)$ is :

$$V = q_1 - q'_1 + \sum_{(i=1, \dots, p)} \alpha^i p^i \quad (2)$$

the problem is to minimize this cost subject to the constraints of admissibility.

Let us introduce the slack variable β^i such that $0 < \beta^i < 1$ and $\alpha^i + \beta^i = 1$ for $i = 1, \dots, p$. Those variables have no financial meaning but allow us to set our optimization problem in a standard way. Write :

$$c = (\rho^1, \dots, \rho^p, 0, \dots, 0, +1, 0, \dots, -1, \dots, 0) \in \mathbb{R}^{2(n+p)}$$

with $p, n-1$ and finally $n-1$ zeros.

$$b = (s_1, \dots, s_n, 1, \dots, 1) \in \mathbb{R}^{n+p}$$

$$A = \begin{pmatrix} & & & s_1 - 1 & 0 & & -s_1 + 1 & 0 \\ & & & s_2 - 1 & & & -s_2 + 1 & \\ E^1, \dots, E^p & 0 & & & & & & \\ & & & 0 & -1 & & 0 & +1 \\ & & & & s_n & & & s_n \\ \hline Id^p & Id^p & 0 & & & & 0 & \end{pmatrix}$$

or using compact notations :

$$A = \begin{pmatrix} E & Op & Z(a) & -Z(a') \\ Id^p & Id^p & Op & Op \end{pmatrix}$$

Note that the matrix $A \in L(\mathbb{R}^{2(n+p)}, \mathbb{R}^{n+p})$ has full rank $n+p$. We finally write :

$$u = (\alpha^1, \dots, \alpha^p, \beta^1, \dots, \beta^p, q_1, \dots, q_n, q'_1, \dots, q'_n).$$

Condition (1) of admissibility can be written $Au = b$, and the cost of strategy u given by (2) is $V=(c,u)$ the scalar product of vectors c and u . We should thus solve the linear program (P):

$$\begin{aligned} & \text{Inf } (c,u) \\ & u \in R^{2(n+p)} \\ & Au = b \\ & u \geq 0 \end{aligned}$$

The dual program (P') is :

$$\begin{aligned} & \text{Sup } (b,h) \\ & h \in R^{n+p} \\ & {}^tAh < c \end{aligned}$$

We shall write $h = {}^t(k,m)$ with $k \in R^n$ and $m \in R^p$.

The dual program is the optimization problem faced by the market. We shall interpret it in section 4.

Recall the basic theorem of linear programming (see [2]):

- (i) (P) admits an optimal solution if and only if (P') admits an optimal solution.
- (ii) (P) admits an optimal solution if the sets of admissible strategies :

$$\begin{aligned} K &= (u \in R^{2(n+p)} / u \geq 0, Au = b) \\ K' &= (h \in R^{n+p} / {}^tAh \leq c) \end{aligned}$$

are both nonempty.

- (iii) The optimal strategies (u,h) of the programs (P) and (P') are characterized by :

$$u \in K, h \in K' \text{ et } (u, {}^tAh - c) = 0$$

3.EXISTENCE AND FIRST PROPERTIES OF A SOLUTION

a) Construction of an admissible strategy for the holder

The strategy $u_0 = {}^t(0, \dots, 0, 1, \dots, 1, q_1, \dots, q_n, 0, \dots, 0)$ with p zeroes, p ones, n zeroes at the end and :

$${}^t(q_1, \dots, q_n) = Z(a)^{-1} s = \begin{pmatrix} a_1 & -1 & & & & \\ & & \ddots & & & \\ & & & \ddots & & \\ & & & & \ddots & \\ & & & & & -1 \\ & 0 & & & & a_n \end{pmatrix}^{-1} \begin{pmatrix} s_1 \\ \vdots \\ \vdots \\ \vdots \\ \vdots \\ s_n \end{pmatrix}$$

is admissible

Actually one can show recursively that :

$$Z(a)^{-1} = \begin{pmatrix} a_1 & -1 & & & \\ & \cdot & \cdot & & 0 \\ & & \cdot & \cdot & \\ 0 & & & \cdot & -1 \\ & & & & a_n \end{pmatrix}^{-1} = \begin{pmatrix} 1/a_1 & 1/a_1 a_2 & \dots & \dots & 1/a_1 \dots a_n \\ & \cdot & & & \\ & & \cdot & & \\ 0 & & & 1/a_{n-1} & 1/a_{n-1} a_n \\ & & & & 1/a_n \end{pmatrix}$$

and this is a nonnegative matrix, therefore : $0 \leq (q_1, \dots, q_n)$

Moreover the equality $Au_0 = b$ can easily be checked.

The suggested strategy consists in investing at the lowest possible yields the present value of the liability **calculated with** these lowest **possible** yields.

b) Efficient strategies

A strategy $u = (a^1, \dots, \alpha^p, \beta^1, \dots, \beta^p, q_1, \dots, q_n, q'_1, \dots, q'_n)$ is said to be **efficient** if :

$0 \leq u$ and $q_i q'_i = 0$ for all $i = 0, \dots, n-1$.

Using $0 \leq u$ and letting $q = {}^t(q_1, \dots, q_n)$ and $q' = {}^t(q'_1, \dots, q'_n)$ this is equivalent to :

$0 \leq u$ and $(q, q') = 0$.

Following an **efficient** strategy one cannot borrow and lend money at the same **time** at the worst possible yields.

c) Existence of an optimal strategy

We have already proved in a) that the set K of admissible solutions of (P) is nonempty.

We shall now prove that the set K' of admissible solutions of the dual problem (P') is also nonempty.

It then follows from property (i) section 2 c) that there exist optimal strategies for both problem (P) and (P').

$h = (k, m)$ is element of K' if and only if :

${}^t A h < c$

that is :

(j) ${}^t E \cdot k + m \leq \rho$

(jj) $m \leq 0$

(jjj) ${}^t Z(a) \cdot k \leq {}^t (1, 0, \dots, 0) \leq {}^t Z(a') \cdot k$

Property (jjj) can be restated :

$1/a'_1 \leq k_1 < 1/a_1$

$1/a'_i \leq k_i/k_{i-1} < 1/a_i$ for $i = 2, \dots, n$.

Clearly k can be **chosen** to satisfy (jj) because $a_i < a'_i$ for every $i = 1, \dots, n$. **One** can then obviously choose a negative m in order to satisfy (j) and (jj): we conclude that the set K' is **nonempty** and therefore that **there** are optimal strategies for (P) and (P').

4. THE SHADOW YIELD CURVE

a) the shadow yield curve and the liquidity premia

Let $V(b, c)$ be the optimal value of problem (P) : $V(b, c) = \text{Inf}(c, u)$

$$\begin{aligned} Au &= b \\ u &> 0 \end{aligned}$$

If $h \in \mathbb{R}^{n+p}$ is a solution of the dual problem (P') : $\text{Sup}(b, h)$

$$\begin{aligned} h &\in \mathbb{R}^{n+p} \\ tAh &\leq c \end{aligned}$$

then $\forall y \in \mathbb{R}^{n+p}, V(y, c) \geq V(b, c) + (h, y - b)$

i.e. h is a subgradient of V (a convex function of y) at point b (See (1)).

If V admits first partial derivatives then by the **enveloppe** theorem :

$$\forall i \in (1, n+p) \partial V / \partial b_i = h_i = k_i$$

For $i = 1, \dots, n$ this property has a financial interpretation : in order to pay one **additional** franc at date i (a marginal variation of $b_i = s_i$), one needs an **additional** $k_i = h_i$ franc at date 0. Thus $k_i = \partial V / \partial b_i$, the marginal cost at date 0 of the franc payable at date i can be interpreted as a discount factor between 0 and i , or alternatively as the **price** at date 0 of a zero coupon bond paying 1 franc at date i .

Therefore the vector $k = (k_1, \dots, k_n)$ defines an endogenous zero coupon bond yield curve. Let us underline that this yield curve depends on the upper (and lower) bounds a'_i (and a_i) assumed for the returns on each period but also depends on the liability we have to finance and on the pool of assets chosen to **carry** on the **optimization**. Moreover

$$\forall i \in [1, p] \partial V / \partial b_{n+i} = m^i$$

m^i is the marginal cost at date 0 of the constraint $\alpha^i \leq 1$. By (jj), this cost is **nonpositive** : it represents the gain on the objective function from the availability on the market of an **additional** unit of asset i at the same price.

The vector $m = (m^1, \dots, m^p)$ will be **referred** to hereafter as the liquidity premium vector.

It turns out as we shall see hereafter that one obtains the present value of any liability in a **neighbourhood** of s , net of liquidity **constraints**, by discounting the liability cash **flows** using the discount factors k_i .

b) Interpretation and properties of the solutions

Let $(u, (k, m))$ be solutions of (P) and (P') respectively. For the sake of simplicity, let us assume that (k, m) is unique.

Property (iii) of section 2.c) can be written :

$$(v) a^i (k_i E^i) + m^i - \rho^i = 0 \quad \text{for } i = 1, \dots, p$$

$$(vv) \beta^i m^i = 0 \quad \text{for } i = 1, \dots, p$$

$$(vvv) q_1 (a_1 k_1 - 1) = 0 \quad q'_1 (a'_1 k_1 - 1) = 0$$

$$q_i (a_i k_i - k_{i-1}) = 0 \quad q'_i (a'_i k_i - k_{i-1}) = 0 \quad \text{for } i = 2, \dots, n$$

But because of (ijj) section 3.a) :

$$1/a'_1 \leq k_1 \leq 1/a_1$$

$$1/a'_i < k_i / k_{i-1} < 1/a_i \quad \text{for } i = 2, \dots, n.$$

That is : the forward rate between date $i-1$ and i on the shadow yield curve lies between the **ex ante** bottom rate a_i and ceiling rate a'_i .

Moreover, condition (vvv) implies that, if the optimal strategy u of the holder involves between date $i-1$ and i borrowing (or **lending**) at the ceiling (**bottom** when lending) rate :

$$q_1 \neq 0 \text{ implies } k_i / k_{i-1} = 1/a_i$$

$$q'_i \neq 0 \text{ implies } k_i / k_{i-1} = 1/a'_i$$

As a consequence, it cannot be optimal to have $q_i \neq 0$ and $q'_i \neq 0$ (because $a_i < a'_i$), that is : **every optimal strategy is efficient.**

For an asset i , there are three possible situations :

1) $m^i < 0$

The liquidity premium is strictly negative. **Condition (vv) then** shows that asset i is entirely bought by the **holder**, and **condition (v)** can be written :

$$(k_i E^i) - \rho^i = -m^i > 0$$

The present value of the asset calculated by using the shadow discount **factors** is strictly superior to its market price : it appears **then** to be natural that the holder buys asset i entirely. Moreover the liquidity premium equals precisely the difference between the market price **of** the asset and its present value.

2) $m^i = 0$ and $\beta^i > 0$

The **asset** is **partly** included in the optimal portfolio but the availability of additional units of the asset **neither** changes the optimal strategy of the **holder** nor the value of the game. Moreover, condition (v) implies :

$$(k_i E^i) = \rho^i$$

The present value of the asset calculated with the shadow discount factors equals its market price.

$$3) m^i = 0 \text{ and } \alpha^i = 0$$

The asset is not part of the optimal portfolio, its market price is too high :

$$(k, E^i) < \rho^i$$

c) Extension of the set of assets

The classification presented in section b) can help us to foresee the potential effects of adding a new asset E^{P+1} to the set of available assets on the market. There are two cases :

$$1) (k, E^{P+1}) < \rho^{P+1}$$

The new asset is too expensive. Letting $\alpha^{P+1} = 0, \beta^{P+1} = 1$ and $m^{P+1} = 0$, one gets a saddle point for the extended problem, as can be verified by condition (iii) of section 2.c), with the same immunization cost. This new asset is useless for our problem.

$$2) (k, E^{P+1}) > \rho^{P+1}$$

Letting $m^{P+1} = \rho^{P+1} - (k, E^{P+1}), h' = (k, m, m^{P+1})$, one gets an admissible strategy for the extended dual problem. Using natural notations one has : $(b', h') = (b, h) + m^{P+1} \leq V'$, where V' is the new immunization cost.

This inequality gives a restriction on the potential gains on the immunization cost from including the new asset. Not surprisingly, the potential gains are bounded by the difference between the market price of the new asset and its present value calculated on the shadow yield curve that is the liquidity premium on the new asset.

d) interpretation of the dual problem

The dual problems (P) and (P') have the same value :

$$V = (b, h) = (c, u)$$

$$\text{i.e. } V = (k, s) + \sum_{(i=1, \dots, p)} m^i = q_1 - q' \cdot 1 + \sum_{(i=1, \dots, p)} \alpha^i \rho^i$$

or, using condition (v) :

$$V - \sum_{(i=1, \dots, p)} m^i = (k, s) = \sum_{(\text{asset of types 1) and 2))} \alpha^i (k, E^i) + q_1 - q' \cdot 1$$

Therefore the liability and the portfolio of assets (including borrowing and lending flows at the date 0) have the same present value when discounted by the shadow yield curve.

When assets are available in any quantity, the liquidity premia are zero and the cost of immunization of a liability is exactly equal to its present value discounting by the shadow yield curve. moreover in this case the interpretation of the dual problem :

$$\begin{aligned} & \text{Sup } (b, h) \\ & h \in R^{n+p} \\ & tAh \leq c \end{aligned}$$

is easier. The present value of the liability (s, k) is maximized on the set of admissible shadow yield curves. Admissibility is defined by :

$$(j) \quad {}^t E.k \leq \rho$$

$$(ij) \quad 1/a' \cdot 1 < k_1 < 1/a_1$$

$$1/a' \cdot i < k_i / k_i - 1 < 1/a_i \quad \text{for } i = 2, \dots, n.$$

which means that the present value of an **asset** discounted on the shadow yield curve must not exceed its market price and that the shadow yield **curve** must lie **between** the imposed lower and upper **bounds**. If there are liquidity **premia** the constraint (j) becomes :

$$(j) \quad {}^t E.k + m \leq \rho$$

but **(1,m)** is **added** to the **objective** function. **Therefore** the shadow yield curve chosen can be such that the present value of an asset is larger than its market **price**, the **difference** however is a cost in the optimal strategy of the market.

It is a classical result of linear programming that when u is a **nondegenerate extreme** point of K , the solution of the dual problem, that is the shadow yield curve and the liquidity premium vector, is unique and does not change in a **neighbourhood** of b .

5. ROBUSTNESS OF THE RESULTS

a) The **ceiling-bottom** rate hypothesis

We now consider the **optimum** $V(a, a')$ of the function of the bottom and ceiling returns a and a' . Let $u = (\alpha^1, \dots, \alpha^p, \beta^1, \dots, \beta^p, q_1, \dots, q_n, q'_1, \dots, q'_n)$ and $h = (k, m) \in \mathbb{R}^{n+p}$ be the **solutions** of (P) and (P') **respectively**, for the parameters a and a' . Then one has by an envelope **theorem** whenever V admits **first derivatives** (See(1)) :

$$\forall i \in [1, n], \quad \partial V / \partial a_i (a, a') = -k_i q_i$$

$$\partial V / \partial a'_i (a, a') = k_i q'_i$$

Suppose as an example that $a_i(r) = 1+r$ and $a_i(r') = 1+r'$ for $i=1, \dots, n$, that is the **ceiling-bottom** returns are constant over the period, then:

$$\partial V / \partial r (a(r), a'(r')) = \sum_{(i=1, \dots, n)} \partial V / \partial a_i \quad \partial a_i / \partial r$$

$$= \sum_{(i=1, \dots, n)} -k_i q_i$$

$$\partial V / \partial r' (a(r), a'(r')) = \sum_{(i=1, \dots, n)} \partial V / \partial a'_i \quad \partial a'_i / \partial r'$$

$$= \sum_{(i=1, \dots, n)} k_i q'_i$$

Let $D = (r' - r)/2$ and $M = (r' + r)/2$, represent respectively the "**volatility**" and "mean" of the **possible** yields. It is then follows that :

$$\partial V / \partial D (a, a') = \sum_{(i=1, \dots, n)} k_i (q_i + q'_i)$$

$$\partial V / \partial M (a, a') = \sum_{(i=1, \dots, n)} k_i (q_i + q'_i)$$

6. IMPLEMENTATION AND EXAMPLE

We used the simplex algorithm for linear programming on its simplest form, described for example in [3]. The program was written in ^(c) C language on a workstation ^(s) SUN 4/110.

a) Data form

It turns out that in this type of situation, the vectors and matrices contain mainly **zeros**. In the example we computed, the assets were short **term** (less than five years) annual coupon bonds. Thus the cash flows vectors have at most five nonzero **coordinates**. **Moreover** the borrowing and lending vectors have by **definition** at most two non zero coordinates. We let n represent the number of dates which have a **nonzero** cash flow. a_i (or a'_i) represents the bottom (or ceiling **return** between the $(i-1)$ -th and the i -th date. We represent the vectors dynamically.

In the **numerical** treatment we standardize the units of the numbers involved (using 1 franc as a unit) in **order** to make the approximation **errors** easier to evaluate. In particular we replace E^i by E^i/ρ^i .

b) Example

In the actual example, **where** we **performed** the calculations, we took $r_{\min} = 5\%$ and $r_{\max} = 15\%$ for France in the next **5** years. The example is based on a real liability faced by a French **firm** in June 1988, and on actual fixed-income **securities** available at that time on the French **market**. We used the simplex algorithm with 476 variable and 238 constraints. **This** is a relatively small linear **program** given the large number of zero elements. It takes a few minutes to converge on our workstation but more powerful versions of the simplex **algorithm** are commercialized.

For this computed example we provide in the appendix :

- The set of available market **assets** plotted in a plane (maturity, yield to maturity).
- **The** shadow yield curves for two cases : bottom rate = 5% and ceiling rate = 15%, or bottom rate = 5% and ceiling rate = infinity (this is for the particular case where you are not allowed to be short at any date in the future).

7. CONCLUSION

Let us end with some **possible** limitations and extensions of our method

We have assumed so far that the market assets were available in any amount and divisible. **If** one wants to include such indivisible assets in the market portfolio, then the function to minimize **turns** out to be one **with** integer arguments, and **one** would have to resort to integer **programming**, with its well-known complexity.

When there is no uncertainty on the future yields, there **still exists a spread between the borrowing and lending rates** (ceiling and bottom rates) which **corresponds to the margin** taken by financial intermediaries. The method still applies in this **case**.

To conclude, the immunization problem **being** fundamentally **caused** by the incompleteness of financial markets, our solution **introduces** ceiling and **bottom** rates to complete the **markets**.

However, there are **many other** possibilities, for instance :

- Minimizing **every nonzero** balance at every date, using for instance a quadratic criterion :

$$\text{Inf } Q(\sum_{(i=1, \dots, p)} \alpha^i E^i - s) + \sum_{(i=1, \dots, p)} \alpha^i \rho^i$$

$$0 \leq \alpha^i \leq 1$$

with Q a positive definite quadratic form.

-The EIPIS methodology (see [4]) which balances cash flows and durations of the **assets** with that of the liability on many **different** time periods.

The comparative appeal of our approach is twofold First, it completely eliminates **the** risk associated with changes in interest **rates, provided** they stay within the prescribed bottom **and** ceiling rates. Second, it **provides** an immunization **cost** including *all cost*, **and** not only an immunization **portfolio**.

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